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P.: Husband and Wife--Auction for Negligence Allowed Against Spouse
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

Even where a telephone conversation has been overheard by
use of a sensitive microphone in an adjacent room without knowledge of either party, testimony has been admitted concerning the
message. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). Where
one party has consented, possibly unwillingly, to the overhearing,
the courts have found little difficulty in holding that there has been
no interception of the message, regardless of how it was overheard.
See Rayson v. United States, 238 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1956); United
States v. Bookie, 229 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1956); Flanders v. United
States, 222 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1955); United States v. Lewis, 87 F.
Supp. 970, rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Billeci v. United States,
184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Only in the Second and District of
Columbia Circuits has it been held that one party to a conversation
can not surrender the other's privilege, and that there is interception unless both parties consent to the overhearing. See James v.
United States, 191 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1951); United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1940).
It would seem that there is little essential difference between
tapping and overhearing a telephone conversation insofar as the
sender is concerned. Nor would it seem that there should be more
valid objection to a wire tap authorized on probable cause than to
a search warrant. Apart from public policy considerations, it is
submitted that there is an illegal interception of a communication
whenever it is heard by a third party without the consent of the
caller and receiver, and that testimony of the third person should
be inadmissible under the present rules. See Rathbun v. United
States, supra at 165 (dissenting opinion).
R. G. D.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-AcnoN FOR NEGIaGECE ALLOWED AGAINST
SPOUSE.-P brought suit to recover for injuries sustained while rid-

ing in an automobile being driven by D. While the action was pending, the parties married. Held, that P could continue her action.
Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 135 A.2d 555 (N.J. Super. 1957).
Under the view taken by a majority of the courts in this country, it has been held that neither spouse can maintain an action
against the other for a personal tort, whether it was committed be-

fore, during or after marriage. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S.
611 (1910); Kelley v. Kelley, 51 RI. 173, 153 AUt. 314 (1931); Buck-
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eye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 284 N.W. 342 (1931); PlossER, ToRs
§ 101 (2d ed. 1955). In arriving at its decision in the principal case,
the court overruled all prior case law of New Jersey which followed
the majority view and joined the evergrowing minority of jurisdictions that construe the Married Women's Property Acts to permit an action by one spouse for a personal tort committed by the
other, whether it be intentional or negligent in character. Jaegerv.
Jaeger, 262 Wis. 14 53 N.W.2d 740 (1952); King v. Gates, 231 N.C.
537, 57 S.E.2d 765 (1950); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. App. 19, 46 P.2d
740 (1935); Johnson v. Johnson,201 Ala. App. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917);
PRossEr, ToiRTs § 101 (2d ed. 1955). The court felt that the only
valid reason for prohibiting such an action was for the preservation
of "domestic peace and felicity," and since this underlying policy
was not factually implicated here, it held the rule of immunity
would not be mechanically applied. So, although New Jersey follows the minority rule, its application is limited to those cases where
the reason for applying the majority rule does not factually exist.
One early case in West Virginia would seem to go along with
this minority view. Good v. Good, 39 W. Va. 357, 19 S.E. 382
(1894). There a widow was allowed to maintain an action of detinue
against her deceased husband's personal representative for her
separate property unlawfully withheld from her. Whatever spark
that might have been ignited by that case, however, was later
smothered by a case more directly in point. Poling v. Poling, 116
W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604, 41 W. VA. L.Q. 429 (1935). This case
involved an action by a husband who was injured while a passenger
in an automobile negligently driven by his wife. In construing West
Virginia's Married Women's Property Act, W. VA. CoDE c. 48, art. 3,
§ 19 (Michie 1955), the court said, "There is a fundamental rule
that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
construed; therefore a radical departure from the common law,
such as the authorization of damage actions between spouses, should
be given birth only through unequivocal legislative enactment."
Another argument for denying relief was based on Securo v. Securo,
110 W. Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931), where an action arising out of
an automobile accident was brought by a daughter against her
father. There it was held that such actions would tend to disrupt
domestic harmony, and thus could not be maintained. The Poling
case said the same reasoning should be applied to tort actions between husbands and wives. See also Staats v. Co-operative Transit
Co., 125 W. Va. 473, 24 S.E.2d 916 (1943), (factually on all fours
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with the principal case); Wright v. Davis, 132 W. Va. 722, 53 S.E.2d
335 (1949). In the latter case a wife's administrator brought
an action for her wrongful death against the administrator of her
deceased husband. Recovery was denied, not only on the basis of
the "common law rule," but also on the ground that it was the
policy of the court to discourage actions which tend to disrupt
domestic harmonyl But ef. Morgan v. Leuck, 137 W. Va. 546, 72
S.E.2d 825, discussed in 55 W. VA. L. REv. 296 (1952).
On the basis of the foregoing decisions it is obvious that West
Virginia strictly adheres to the majority rule. The question which
thus arises is whether or not this view is based on sound reasoning in the light of our present day society.
The first reason given in the Poling case for denying a right of
action between husband and wife was that the statute granting the
wife a right to sue in her own name was in derogation of the common law and thus should be strictly construed. Although this principle is true so far as it goes, it is submitted that it is not applicable
to actions between spouses. Originally equity had always recognized the duality between husband and wife, but the common law
had always regarded them as one, so no suit could arise between
them because of the impossibility of the same person being both
plaintiff and defendant in the same suit. The common law rule was
not due to precedents opposed to such actions, but to the fiction of
unity which prevented them from being brought at all. Haglund,
Tort Actions Between Husband and Wife, 27 GEo. L.J. 697, 704
(1939). Since the advent of the Married Women's Property Acts,
there is no longer a logical reason for holding on to this anachronistic
fiction. Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., supra.
As previously stated, the Koplik case expressed the belief that
the only sound reason for the rule denying recovery was for the
preservation of domestic harmony. This rule has been applied
literally and blindly in many cases where the reason behind it could
not possibly apply inasmuch as there was no home to disrupt and no
domestic harmony to disturb. Wright v. Davis, supra; HApn &
JAMms, ToRTs § 8.10 (1956). "The danger of domestic discord and
many tivial suits is at best an a priori reason, and the possibility
of severe injury which must remain unredressed seems at least as
strong a counter-consideration." McCurdy, Torts Between Persons
in Domestic Relation, 43 HAv. L. Bv.1030, 1054 (1930).
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One important aspect of these negligence cases that obviously
eliminates substantially the likelihood that serious friction between
the parties will attend the prosecution of the litigation is the presence of liability insurance. Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., supra.
"There is no record of a suit for negligence between husband and
wife where insurance was not involved, nor would common sense
expect any such suit between parties so related unless insurance
was involved." Haglund, supra at 920. The suit is friendly and for
the mutual advantage of both parties to the action. An insurance
company that has received consideration for the contract it entered
into with the insured is entitled to no sympathy if it is called upon
to pay indemnity incurred by an accident insured against. Upon
the theory that the suit was rendered friendly by the existence of
indemnity insurance, the West Virginia court has permitted an
action in the analogous relationship of parent and child. Lusk v.
Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 588 (1932); Comment, 41 W. V.,
L.Q. 429 (1934). The Poling case escapes the difficulty of distinguishing the Lusk case by ignoring it, and by relying on the
earlier Securo case.
There is a common law maxim-when the reason for a rule
ceases the rule itself ceases-that courts should not overlook. Courts
should abandon a rule which denies suits for negligence between
spouses, when there is no longer a reason behind it, as in cases
involving indemnity insurance, and when its retention serves no
other purpose than to enable insurance companies to escape liability.
Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., supra; Haglund, supra at 921. "The
court should weigh the insubstantiality of the threat to domestic
concord in each case against the increasingly emphasized philosophy
of modem jurisprudence that those hurt by the wrong of others
should have reparation-a viewpoint which has been steadily eroding obsolete notions of immunity." Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp.,
supra at 559. The limited minority view taken by the Koplik
case seems to be a logical choice between the two extremes-one
which will allow recoveries between husband and wife in all cases
and one which will allow such recovery in none.
T. E. P.
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